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“The policy of intimidation had been so successfully managed that many colored men kept away
from the polls”: Violence in the Reconstruction Era South

MaryKatherine Klaybor
Butler University

1
Reconstruction, “the period from 1865 to 1877 when national efforts were concentrated
on incorporating the South back into the Union after the Civil War,” was one of the most
turbulent periods of US history.1 Throughout the Reconstruction era, the Republican Party
favored a process that would secure the rights of black Southerners, which faced opposition from
many Democrats. This pushback often took the form of political violence against white
Republicans in the South as well as freedpeople who attempted to take part in politics and assert
their newly granted rights of citizenship. Mounting opposition against the federal government’s
Reconstruction policy in the South led to unrest as some Southerners engaged in organized
political violence in order to maintain aspects of antebellum society.
In this paper I argue that in particular, Mississippi and Georgia during the late 1860s and
early 1870s were states where racial, social, and political tension erupted into violence. Both
Mississippi, a state famous for organized political terror in what would become known as the
Mississippi Plan, and Georgia, where residents initially took a more subtle approach to
disenfranchisement of black residents, had Democrats who ultimately utilized political violence
in their reconstruction plans. The terror was significant because it served as a way for white
Southern Democrats to maintain political and social control over freedpeople, overthrow
Republican governments in Southern states, strengthen white supremacy, and ultimately bring
about an end to Reconstruction in the South. The social and political chaos in the wake of the
Civil War created a space for white Southern Democrats to engage in political violence, and
bring about the end of Reconstruction.
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After the Civil War ended in 1865, the federal and state governments began deliberating
to determine a process for reunifying the nation. This was extremely difficult for several reasons,
especially the fact that the highly destructive Civil War was unprecedented, so there was no
blueprint for how best to reunite the nation. Reconstruction sought to bring the nation together
again, restructure the Southern economy into a free labor society, and address the question of
political rights for freedpeople. It was a process of trial and error, as various individuals and
groups argued about the best course of action for the country. In addition, the assassination of
President Abraham Lincoln sent shock waves across the nation and thrust Andrew Johnson into
the presidency. Johnson’s approach to Reconstruction put him at odds with many members of
Congress, especially the Radical Republicans, in terms of creating a plan for Reconstruction and
this added to the confusion and uncertainty of the process in the South. 2
Another barrier to the process was the enormity of the task of restructuring the entirety of
the Southern social, economic, and political systems. Prior to the war, a racialized system of
slavery was crucial to society. While the war did not bring about an end to racism by any means,
the abolition of slavery posed a threat to the general stability of these Southern states as well as
the power of white supremacy. When Georgia’s Alexander Stephens served as Vice President of
the Confederacy he claimed, “[The Confederate States government’s] foundations are laid, its
cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man, that slavery,
subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition.”3 In Mississippi and
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Radical Republicans were those with a “deep commitment to racial equality” and they believed
that “Federal and state governments should be color-blind, with civil rights guaranteed to all
regardless of race” (K. Stephen Prince, introduction to Radical Reconstruction, [Boston, MA:
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In his Cornerstone Address given on March 21, 1861, Stephens spoke about the important role
slavery played in the formation of the Confederacy, and urged other slave states to join
(Alexander H. Stephens, “Cornerstone Address,” in Southern Pamphlets on Secession, November
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Georgia, as well as in many other places across the South, slavery was a critical component of
antebellum society. In 1860, Georgia and Mississippi ranked second and third among the states
for the highest slave population.4 According to the United States Census Bureau, in 1860
Georgia contained 462,198 slaves out of a total state population of 1,057,286 residents.5
Mississippi had 436,631 slaves with a total state population of 791,305 residents.6 The sheer
number of slaves in these states, and the wealth they generated highlights the critical role slavery
played in their social, political, and economic systems. For example, prior to the outbreak of the
Civil War, Mississippi was a hub of plantation slavery where a “robust plantocracy” built
mansions to showcase their wealth, status, and power.7 From 1800 to 1860 the population in the
state grew rapidly alongside the increase in cotton production in the area, making many
slaveholders incredibly wealthy.8
In antebellum Mississippi, black men, women, and children were bought and sold,
separated from their families, overworked, and beaten in order for the state’s economy to boom
and plantation owners to become rich. Slaves who were “doomed to the block” were examined
and sold to the highest bidder, as though they were nothing but livestock or furniture.9 After
these auctions, plantation owners forced their slaves to labor under horrible conditions and often
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beat and humiliated them. In addition to the physical misery that slaves experienced in
antebellum Mississippi, hatred and racism ran deep through Southern society, and slaves were
viewed as sub-human. In his 1851 book on Mississippi, writer Joseph Cobb claimed,
A southern negro is regarded as a living deformity of vice and prostitution, a being with
the shape of man, but lower in infamy than the brute; a member of the great human
family whose situation is so depraved and isolated…so entirely cut off from sympathy
with the human race, that all association with him is considered dangerous and
contaminating.10
Many white Mississippians felt a sense of superiority over their slaves and this was deeply
entrenched throughout the state’s institutions. This poor treatment of slaves and the sentiment
that they were not worthy of respect makes clear the difficulty of promoting political rights to
freedpeople in the Reconstruction period, barely two decades after Cobb wrote his text on life in
Mississippi. Yet, the reliance on slavery and tense relationships between slaves and slaveholders
was not unique to Mississippi in the antebellum era. Georgia’s economy also relied heavily on
slave labor and its dependence on slavery in the antebellum period foreshadows its resistance to
the postwar reconstruction process. In antebellum Georgia, many white families in the central
part of the state were slaveholders, while “the rest owed their livelihoods and social privileges to
slavery.”11 Thus, after emancipation the entire state was thrust into confusion and the livelihood
of many white families was jeopardized.
Eric Foner further details the difficulty associated with the Southern states coming to
terms with the end of slavery. He explains that, “…the rebelling Southern states…could not
resume their erstwhile position without acknowledging the destruction of slavery—a requirement
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that implied far-reaching changes in Southern society and politics.”12 While voting eligibility
was granted to nearly all adult white men in the antebellum era South, “slavery everywhere
undergirded a pattern of political and economic privilege which seemed to discriminate against
non-slaveholders.”13 These antebellum slaveholders controlled politics, and thereby society.
However, when slavery was abolished and freedmen were granted political rights, including the
right to vote, this political system and the power structures within it began to shift. The powerful
Southern whites who had previously dominated politics now had to watch their former slaves
casting ballots.14 Many political elites believed that these black men were not fit to participate
politically and this created tension that boiled over into everyday life in the South and formed a
barrier to Reconstruction.
The process of Reconstruction was further exacerbated by the pressure the federal
government was under to reunify the country. When the war ended, the South needed to be
brought back into the nation and Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson believed this
needed to be done in a timely manner. The longer it took for a course of action to be planned and
implemented, the more difficult it would be to bring the nation together, as keeping the Southern
states in a sort of limbo was inefficient and chaotic. This is evident through both Mississippi and
Georgia, which were not fully readmitted to the Union until 1870, several years later than many
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of the other Southern states.15 A large portion of the problem with Reconstruction lay in the fact
that restructuring the South required more than simply declaring the nation whole again.
As previously noted, the Southern economic, social, and political systems needed to be
rebuilt without slavery and this process required time and resources. Therefore, a paradox
emerged as President Johnson wanted to reunify the nation as painlessly and quickly as possible,
while it became increasingly clear that this process could not happen overnight. Further,
Thaddeus Stevens, an influential Radical Republican in Congress, argued for a complete
transformation of the South in the post-war era, a plan that could not be accomplished quickly.
Stevens argued,
In reconstruction…reformation must be effected; the foundation of [the South’s]
institutions, both political, municipal, and social must be broken up and relaid, or all our
blood and treasure have been spent in vain. This can only be done by treating and holding
them as a conquered people.16
The South could not be transformed easily and quickly if the impacts were to be long-lasting.
Thus, the paradox of time created another roadblock for the success of Reconstruction in both
Mississippi and Georgia.
After Lincoln was assassinated and Johnson became President, Johnson chose to
implement a lenient process of re-entry for the former Confederate states in hopes of bringing the
nation together as quickly as possible. He believed that as president he should be the one to
decide on a Reconstruction plan, not Congress because the president is elected by the people and
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James Wilford Garner, Ph.M., Reconstruction in Mississippi (London: The Macmillan
Company, 1901), 273-274. William Harris Bragg, “Reconstruction,” in The Civil War in
Georgia: A New Georgia Encyclopedia Companion, ed. John C. Inscoe (Athens, GA: University
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represents “all American people.”17 One historian described Johnson as, “[c]onfident of the
correctness of his ideas, feeling sure that they were the only logical results of a true interpretation
of the Constitution, [Johnson] pursued his policy of Reconstruction.”18 His plan stood in stark
contrast to the beliefs he expressed immediately after his inauguration. Initially, Johnson stressed
that the former Confederates were traitors and thus deserved to be met with severity and
punishment.19 He even went so far as to claim, “[t]reason must be made odious, and traitors must
be punished and impoverished.”20
However, when it came time to implement a Reconstruction strategy, Johnson’s actions
did not match up to his earlier sentiments. Johnson’s plan involved great leniency and he
ultimately dispensed numerous pardons to Southerners.21 He was “[f]iercely committed to states’
rights in handling the Reconstruction questions,” and his plan placed the responsibility mainly on
the individual Southern states to direct their own Reconstruction processes.22 Charles Chadsey
details the basis of Johnson’s plan and writes that it “seemed to commit to a recently
insurrectionary people the whole responsibility for proper reconstruction.”23 Therefore,
Johnson’s plan placed great trust in the Southern states to direct their own reconstruction and did
not involve much federal oversight. This minimal federal role in the process laid the groundwork
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for Southern states to continue their racially biased legal systems, and it influenced the later
inability of the federal government to intervene in order to quell the political violence.
A speedy reunification process such as the one implemented by Johnson was not popular
with all government officials. President Johnson and many Republicans in Congress were at odds
over several pieces of legislation that involved “the question of the status and future of the
newly-freed blacks in the South.”24 The Radical Republicans wanted the Southern states to pay
for their act of secession and sought to prevent a restoration of the antebellum status quo.25 They
believed federal oversight and aid through programs such as the Freedmen’s Bureau were
necessary, while Johnson wanted to grant the southern states autonomy in directing their own
reconstruction.26 This tension and hostility further damaged the possibility of a smooth
Reconstruction, as President Johnson vetoed bills such as the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 due to his dedication to states’ rights.27 In the end, Johnson’s plan of
Reconstruction allowed Southern states to re-enter the Union in a quick fashion and his lenient
oversight of these states created conditions where violence could occur.
In Mississippi, Johnson’s leniency with his Reconstruction plan was evident, as it
allowed for the creation of Black Codes in the state. These racial codes, the first in the postwar
South, severely restricted the opportunities of freedpeople in Mississippi.28 The intent of these
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Andrew Johnson, The Papers of Andrew Johnson Volume 10, February-July 1866, ed. Paul H.
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In November 1865 Mississippi became the first state to enact black codes and many other
Southern states followed their example. These Black Codes granted some rights to freedpeople
while simultaneously discriminating against them. Black Mississippians gained the right to
marry, own property, and testify in court. However, others ensured freedpeople continued to
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codes was to maintain white supremacy within the state and disadvantage black Mississippians.
Specifically, the laws heavily restricted the economic opportunities and movements of black
Mississippians.29 Nicholas Lemann writes,
Like other Confederate states, Mississippi had, just after the war, with the tacit
encouragement of President Andrew Johnson, convened a legislature made up mainly of
unrepentant Confederates, and it had passed ‘black codes’ that legislated the freed slaves
into a condition as close to their former one as it was possible to get without actually
reinstituting slavery.30
The creation of these black codes and the lack of oversight on the part of Johnson and the federal
government set the stage for the political violence that would erupt in the mid-1870s as
unchecked white Southern Democrats violently exerted political control over newly freed people.
Georgia took a different route for crafting its reconstruction process and granting freedom
and liberties to newly freed slaves in the state. The Georgia legislature did not pass the same
degree of “black codes” that Mississippi did during this era.31 Yet, this lack of severity in
Georgia’s laws did not stem from a concern for the newly emancipated slaves in the state. In
fact, a common sentiment among white Georgians was, “[h]atred, fear, resentment, and distrust
of the [black population].”32 Instead, Georgia’s elites planned to grant black men just enough
rights and liberties to minimize interference from the Freedmen’s Bureau33 or other federal

work as agricultural laborers (“Mississippi Black Codes, 1865,” in Reconstruction: a Reference
Guide, ed. Paul E. Teed and Melissa Ladd Teed [Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015],
203).
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“Mississippi Black Codes, 1865,” in Reconstruction, 203.
30
Nicholas Lemann, Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2006), 34.
31
Alan Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota
Press, 1966), 55.
32
Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia, 63.
33
The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands or the “Freedmen’s Bureau” was
an agency of the federal government that provided “social welfare programs to the former
rebellious states and their localities” and the primary goal “to assist and protect the freedmen in
their new social status.” Congress passed the legislation to create the Bureau on March 3, 1865
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institutions.34 The seemingly benign nature of Georgia’s reconstruction plan kept federal
involvement at a minimum and allowed Georgia to maintain greater control over its
reconstruction process. This autonomy ultimately created the conditions for violence and terror
to spring up across the state with relatively little consequence. Once again, Johnson’s leniency
allowed the states to choose their own reconstruction paths, and the lack of federal oversight led
to violence and the victimization of black people across the South, particularly in Georgia and
Mississippi.
After the Civil War the entire economic system of the slave South had to be altered and
this shift was another point of tension between black Southerners and white Southern Democrats,
which erupted into violence. The Federal Government’s expectation that the South was to
become a free labor society was not popular among many Southerners, especially white
plantation owners. There was a widely held belief across the Southern states that freedpeople
would not labor without force because they were greedy or lazy. These sentiments are expressed
in a report from Sidney Andrews, who travelled to various Southern states in the postwar period
and reported on white Southern attitudes towards free black labor. His report documents some
Southerners’ belief that, “[t]he experiment of free [black] labor is bound to be a failure…”
because black men and women would not labor on their own without the coercion of slavery.35
In addition to the belief that black Southerners would not labor freely, many Southern
whites also had the opinion that black men were unfit to participate in government. This would
become a major roadblock to a peaceful and efficient Reconstruction process, as the issue of

(Ira C. Colby, “The Freedmen's Bureau: From Social Welfare to Segregation,” Phylon [1960201]) 46, no. 3 [1985]: 219-220).
34
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Observation in Georgia and the Carolinas, (Boston, MA: Ticknor and Fields, 1866), 101.

11
rights and citizenship and who could claim them often led to violence. In Georgia for example,
the granting of freedoms and rights to black residents was a subjective and sporadic process.
Essentially, as Andrews reports, in the South, “the position decreed for the Negro was one of
political oblivion, social inferiority, and superficial legal equality. Legal equality was entirely
dependent upon the good will and the genuine desire of the lawmakers and law enforcers to
provide equality of treatment before the law.”36 While legal equality among black and white
Georgians existed in theory, a power imbalance between the races was the reality.
The belief that black men were not qualified to govern is evident in Georgia’s changes to
their legislature throughout the Reconstruction era. While there were thirty-three black
legislators elected in Georgia in 1868, they faced scrutiny and hostility as they “attempted to take
their seats for the opening of the Georgia General Assembly.”37 The white members of the
legislature voted to bar all the black members, and were successful in doing so,38 claiming that
black members of the legislature were “unconstitutional” and this increased tensions within the
state.39 At the time these black men were elected, the once explicit racial requirements for
holding public office were no longer included in the state’s constitution, therefore the election of
black legislators was legal, although still contested.40
In Georgia’s 1865 constitution, signed in November, the requirements for holding state
office included a racial component, specifying that, “[t]he electors of members of the General
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Assembly shall be free white male citizens of this State...and no person not qualified to vote for
members of the General Assembly shall hold any office in this State.”41 However, in the state’s
1868 constitution the voting and office-holding requirements do not utilize racial language and
simply require that the elected officials be citizens of the State for at least one or two years
depending on the office.42 The ousting of Georgia’s black legislators thus received backlash from
those who supported equality among the races as the existence of black legislators did not
explicitly violate any portion of the state’s revised constitution. The removal of Georgia’s thirtythree black legislators attracted national attention, and when it was paired with the political
violence that erupted in the state, it sparked federal involvement that Georgia previously tried to
avoid by passing their more lenient black codes.
Political violence carried out by the Ku Klux Klan played a major role in Georgia’s post1867 elections. The tactics used by the Klan to intimidate black voters heavily impacted the
results of these races. This was particularly true in 1868, as this year marked the first presidential
election in Georgia in the postwar period. In his piece on Reconstruction Georgia, John
Matthews observes that in regard to the question of whether, “fraud, intimidation and violence,
including the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, characterized this election there can be no doubt.”43
The violence perpetrated by the Klan in Georgia was purposeful, obvious, and precise. In fact,
“Klan violence was rarely random, and white raiders did not simply assault blacks for being
black.”44 This distinction is crucial because random violence would have minimized its political
impact and been less successful in keeping white men in power in the state of Georgia. Fear and
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hostility still led some white Georgians to engage in less organized violence if they felt that their
power as white men was under attack. In fact, “[a]ny assault upon the citadel of white supremacy
could bring an instinctive violent reaction, not so much on a personal basis but against the race
generally.”45 There were many calculated instances of political violence, yet fear and paranoia
led to some more generalized violence against black Georgians during this era.
Many of these calculated acts of violence were carried out by organized groups of white
supremacists such as the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan was essentially, “a terrorist group that used
violence against blacks and white Republicans in the name of preserving the morality and virtue
of white civilization.”46 Members of the Klan in Georgia claimed they were,
an organization, a brotherhood of the property-holders, the peaceable, law-abiding
citizens of the State, for self-protection. The instinct of self-protection prompted the
organization; the sense of insecurity and danger, particularly in those neighborhoods
where the [black] population largely predominated.47
This viewpoint expressed by Klan members highlights that they either believed, or wanted others
to believe, that their organization was one of merely protective aims, seeking to defend
themselves from a black population they deemed as dangerous. However, historian Eric Foner
counters the claim of self-protection and instead states, “[The Klan] aimed to reverse the
interlocking changes sweeping over the South during Reconstruction: to destroy the Republican
party’s infrastructure, undermine the Reconstruction state, reestablish control of the black labor
force, and restore racial subordination in every aspect of Southern life.”48 Essentially he argues
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that the Klan wanted to maintain as many aspects of the antebellum South as possible, including
upholding white supremacy and taking control over the former slaves.
The elections of 1868 served as the perfect opportunity for the Klan to increase its scope
and intensity, as its members fought to maintain white supremacy and restore Democratic rule to
the South. Eager to control the elections as well as to “keep [black men] in [their] place
economically, socially, and politically,” the Klan escalated its violence that year in Georgia.49 In
addition, the absence of an effective military force to combat political terrorism created a space
for the KKK to rise and maintain a stronghold in the state. 1868 was the first presidential election
since the end of the Civil War and a lot was on the line for the residents of Georgia. Therefore,
some white Democrats were willing to utilize a variety of tactics to maintain their own power.
This election had the potential to either uphold white supremacy in the state and keep Georgia’s
freed people in a subservient position despite the end of slavery, or allow these black men to
have a voice in the political realm and undercut the institution of white supremacy. Thus,
tensions were high as “Conservative Georgia whites were determined to win back control of their
government, but at the same time, newly-enfranchised blacks along with white Republicans
(scalawags and carpetbaggers)50 were equally determined to retain their voice in Georgia
politics.”51 These tensions played out in political acts of violence throughout the year.
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Despite its slow beginning, organized political violence reached a higher, more intense,
and more widespread level in Georgia than anywhere else in the South. In particular, Warren
County, Georgia “descended much further into terrorism in 1869 than most Southern counties
ever got.”52 In this area, “Ku Klux Klan violence began seriously in the summer of 1868. Night
riding, with accompanying whippings and shootings, became an almost nightly occurrence, and
the Klan murdered its first Negro in September.”53 Yet, Warren County was not the only locale
in Georgia to experience intense political terrorism as men, women, and children across the state
were impacted by this violence.
Typically, the assaults were targeted at black Georgians, yet some white people were
subjected to political terrorism if they were seen as obstacles to the Democratic Party or white
supremacy groups in the area.54 A prime example of this was the murder of George Ashburn, a
white Republican who was killed on March 31, 1868 by what was thought to be his political
enemies, members of the Democratic Party in disguise.55 Many instances of political violence
were never reported, however, because of the lack of justice within the state, and the victims’
reluctance to come forward. Despite horrific acts of violence, terror, and rage, there was little
justice for victims of the KKK, and the lack of consequences served as motive for Klan members
to continue their violent acts.56
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The story of Perry Jeffers and his family sheds light on the experience of black families
who the Klan deemed to be obstacles to white supremacy in the state. Klansmen came to Perry
Jeffers’ home after hearing he was going to vote for Ulysses S. Grant and shot at him through the
walls.57 He returned fire and killed and injured some of the men.58 They later returned with 50 to
100 men to find only Jeffers’ wife and their bedridden son at the house while the other family
members hid in the woods.59 Yet this did not deter the assailants. from committing horrible acts
of violence towards the wife and sick child.60 Trelease details the heinous crime, noting that the
two:
were dragged outside, and the son was shot eleven times. The Klansmen then threw out
the cabin’s contents—furniture, feather mattresses, and all—making a pile of them in the
yard. To this they added the boy’s body and then set fire to the whole. Finally they seized
the mother and with a length of bed cord hung her from a tree. As soon as they rode off,
the woman was cut down; she survived but continued to bear the marks of her
treatment.61
This incident of Klan violence highlights the severity of the harm inflicted upon black Georgians
as well as the cruelty of the Klan members who would murder a sick child in order to impact the
political leanings of the boy’s father.
The violence in Georgia did not go unnoticed by a national audience, and while justice
was rarely administered to the victims, some individuals tried to ease the situation and provide
aid to those impacted by the violence by documenting their stories. In the late 1860s in Georgia
“[c]ommittees were organized to gather reports of violence that allegedly accompanied the
presidential campaign, going on at the same time, and to present this information to Congress.”62
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Delegates at an all-black protest convention in Macon, Georgia created these committees as they,
“expressed the feeling of outrage that prevailed in the fall of 1868” and “warned whites of the
growing independence of black voters.”63 Stories that were documented during these efforts
provide evidence for the political terrorism that individuals experienced in Georgia during
Reconstruction.
Caroline Smith was one such individual who testified before the Congressional
Committee about her experience as a black woman facing Klan violence.64 She details how they
took her out of her house at night and whipped because she was accused of disrespecting a white
woman.65 This experience highlights the abuse that black men, women, and children faced in
Georgia during Reconstruction and the efforts to try to “keep [black men and women] in [their]
place” of social, economic, and political subservience.66
Abram Colby’s experiences show the varying tactics and the degree of violence utilized
by members of the Democratic Party to impact the elections in Georgia. Colby testified to the
Congressional Committee about his experiences with political terrorism.67 He claimed that some
members of the Democratic Party in Georgia offered him $5,000 if he would agree to give up his
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seat in the Georgia legislature during Reconstruction, yet he refused.68 When he did not comply
with the demand, the Klan targeted Colby with violence. His testimony read:
“Question. You had voted in the legislature for Foster Blodgett, and had voted at the polls
for Bullock and Grant?69
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And that was the reason they gave for whipping you?
Answer. Yes sir; and they said I had influence with the negroes of other counties, and had
carried negroes against them...”70
The violence that Abram Colby experienced was directly linked to his political affiliation. Klan
members who supported the Democratic Party saw him as a threat to their efforts in Georgia and
sought to silence his voice and his vote.
1868 in Georgia bore witness to both individual and group acts of violence aimed at
black men and women. The Freedmen’s Bureau documented many of these attacks, including a
race riot that took place. In fact, “[o]utrages and guerrilla warfare against [black men and
women] were widespread in Georgia. General [John Randolph] Lewis of the Freedmen’s
Bureau71 reported 260 attacks, whippings and murders of freedmen between January and
November 1868. In September, there was a race riot at Camilla.”72 The Camilla riot occurred
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when Democrats disrupted a Republican parade by firing on it, and in the end twenty black
marchers were either injured or killed in the assault.73 The Camilla riot was not simply a protest
that got out of hand and resulted in violence. Rather, the riot “had been part of a ‘concerted
determination’ among whites in the Second Congressional District ‘to force the colored vote and
to prevent a canvass by Republicans.’”74 Thus, the riot was an organized effort to reduce voter
turnout among Republicans and restore the Democratic party to power.
The violence organized by white Democrats in Camilla was extremely effective for
advancing the party’s political agenda. Several outcomes from the riot highlight this. First, in the
aftermath, Major O.H. Howard encouraged freedmen “to avoid political meetings except in their
own neighborhoods, and ‘then always without arms.’”75 The advice was intended as a protective
measure for the freedmen, yet it also had the consequence of limiting their political involvement
and in turn, their political power.76 In addition, the riot scared many black Georgians in Camilla,
causing them to stay home and avoid the polls. On election day only two Republicans cast their
ballots.77 This incredibly low voter turnout in the aftermath of the Camilla riot illustrates its
effectiveness. In fact, “[i]t was clear to most observers that campaign violence and election fraud
did work.”78 The effectiveness of political violence created a cycle that popularized intimidation
as it generated its intended consequence of maintaining white supremacy and granting power to
the Democratic Party in Georgia.
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Violent acts of terror alone were not enough to alter the election results in Georgia in the
late 1860s and early 1870s, however. The Democratic Party’s use of more subtle intimidation
tactics paired with the political terrorism further increased the party’s power in the state during
the Reconstruction era. In the 1868 election for example, the successes of the Democratic party
were due in part to restricting black men from voting utilizing a variety of tactics. In Crenshaw
County, Georgia white officials strategically placed barricades so that “every [black] voter had to
run the gauntlet of their jeers and threats.”79 This method of disenfranchisement for black voters
served as a secondary measure to keep away those who were not deterred by the political
terrorism that ran rampant throughout Georgia prior to the election. If violence and intimidation
did not keep black voters away from the polls, then white Georgian Democrats would simply not
allow black men to cast a ballot. This plan kept black men from voting by attempting to
circumvent the “Civil War Amendments.”80
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The violence and intimidation in Georgia in 1868 had consequences that impacted
Georgia residents long after the new year began. One major impact81 of the 1868 violence was
the restoration of military rule82 in Georgia under the direction of President Ulysses S. Grant. 83
Unchecked Klan violence raised concerns about Georgia’s readiness to reenter the Union, and on
December 22, 1869 Congress created stricter requirements for Georgia’s readmittance.84 This
included agreeing to the Reorganization Act for Georgia in December of 1869,85 which
“required the governor to summon the original legislature elected in April, 1868; the expelled
[black legislators] were to be reseated, whites unable to fulfill the test oath were to be excluded,
and the legislature was to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment before Georgia could be readmitted to
the union.”86 Yet, these changes were not long term as the military intervention lasted only a year
and Philip Joiner was the only black representative to serve more than one term.87
Once again Georgia fell victim to the violence and chaos of political terrorism as White
Democrats continued to utilize terror and fear in order to achieve their aims.88 In fact, Klan
violence increased in many places in Georgia during the 1870 election and most of the victims
were black.89 While Klan activity increased, it no longer took the same form as in previous years.
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The 1870 election in Georgia saw less systematic violence than in 1868, but “the memory of
earlier Ku Klux raids kept many [black men] from voting and stimulated others to cast
Democratic ballots.”90
Despite the attempts to quell political violence in the early 1870s, organized groups
continued to terrorize black Georgians and Republicans. The new system of political terror that
arose after the state’s re-admittance to the Union was less upfront and more difficult to punish.
As Allen W. Trelease states,
“[b]y the end of 1870 Georgia Democrats had devised a system of intimidation which no
longer required the grosser outrages of the Ku Klux Klan…Georgia pioneered for the
deep South in developing a more subtle and acceptable way of nullifying [black]
majorities than the rustic terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan.”91
Thus, political violence did not end with military interference or a new state constitution, rather
it shifted forms and continued to run unchecked through the 1870s.
Besides altering the economic system of the South, Reconstruction aimed to bring about
legal equality between the races. The intervention of the federal government to accomplish this
goal, paired with the idea that black men would have political power, including the right to vote,
was unpopular across the South. The federal government, through the passage of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, forced the South to grant political rights to black men. Georgia was
not readmitted to the Union until it ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, along with other
stipulations, which did not occur until 1870.92 However, it is clear from the numerous incidents
of political violence, especially attacks that occurred at night on black Southerners’ homes, or at
the polls themselves, that these amendments were not always strictly enforced. The
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Reconstruction Amendments were disliked by many Southerners and some worked to
circumvent the amendments or flat out refused to enforce them. In fact, according to Joel Hays,
After the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, African Americans
gained the right to vote and the right to participate in the democratic process. The
enfranchisement of the African American population led to the creation of white
supremacist organizations that resorted to intimidation, violence, and assassinations to
prevent African Americans from exercising their civil and voting rights.93
These groups aimed to keep black men from exercising their right to vote and wanted to ensure
that white supremacy would continue to reign in the South.
Hannah Rosen’s, Terror in the Heart of Freedom: Citizenship, Sexual Violence, and the
Meaning of Race in the Postemancipation South, depicts the era as a “region of terror” and
highlights the prevalence of vigilantism that occurred during Reconstruction and made this an
extremely violent era.94 Throughout the text, Rosen highlights the political motivation for these
acts of violence as well as their implications by describing how organized groups of white men
inflicted terror on black people in their homes at night, and how the actions of these groups, such
as the Klan, were often justified in the minds of those inflicting the terror. She writes, “[r]umors
circulating among whites to justify Klan violence described African American men and women
as threatening the orderly arrangement of sexuality and domestic life along racial lines in
southern society.”95 This excerpt highlights the sentiment that white Southerners viewed
themselves as superior to their black neighbors and justified using violence in order to maintain
societal order.
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Political terrorism ran rampant throughout the South in this era, as many white
Democrats utilized political violence to maintain a racial hierarchy and overthrow Republican
rule. Yet, not all white Southerners sought to keep black men and women subservient and
prevent black men from exercising their political rights. Governor James Lusk Alcorn of
Mississippi96 published his views on the political situation of the state in 1867 and detailed his
plan to address the newly gained rights of black men in the South.97 In his writing, Alcorn
expressed his desire to uphold the rights granted to black men by Congress, and detailed his
willingness to discuss politics with black men and even vote with them, as well as creating a
political party that consisted of black and white men together.98 Many Mississippians viewed
these beliefs as extreme and Alcorn while proposing a mixed race political party declared that,
“[i]f this be radicalism, then indeed, gentlemen, do I confess that I am a thorough radical…”99
Governor Alcorn’s approach to the political scene of Reconstruction was in stark contrast to the
white supremacist sentiments expressed by group like the Klan or the Red Shirts that were active
in Mississippi during the Reconstruction era.
As time progressed, many individuals became frustrated with Reconstruction and wanted
it and its violence to end. Southern whites and Democrats disliked the federal Reconstruction
policy from the start but in the mid-1870s, even some Republicans and Northerners grew
impatient with the process and its apparent failure. People across the nation were becoming tired
of the divisions it caused in society, and many viewed the efforts as a failure because of the
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persistent violence that accompanied them. In 1875, a decade after the Civil War ended, violence
towards black Southerners and growing sentiments of despair and frustration were continually
evident. Mississippi governor Adelbert Ames100 continually pleaded with the federal government
to send him aid in quelling the violence throughout the state that threatened elections.101
Attorney General Edwards Pierrepont replied to the request in 1875 with excerpts from President
Ulysses S. Grant which read, “‘[t]he whole public are tired out with these annual autumnal
outbreaks in the South, and the great majority are ready now to condemn any interference on the
part of the Government.”102 At this time, a general weariness with Reconstruction set in across
the nation, and many people wanted the federal government to stop interfering within Southern
states.
The political violence in both Mississippi and Georgia in the mid-1870s was so
prominent in part because the federal government was at various points either unable or
unwilling to address the violence and prevent it from occurring. The violence that accompanied
the Reconstruction process was taking a toll on the federal government and its resources. Further,
the cost of funding the Freedmen’s Bureau and the use of federal troops was a burden.103
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Beginning in 1865, federal troops occupied the eleven former Confederate states to carry out the
reconstruction process.104 When the federal government chose to intervene, they sent troops to
Southern states to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments and attempt to control the rampant
violence against Republicans and black Southerners. However, as time progressed the number of
troops was reduced from 270,000 in June 1865 to 87,550 by January 1866 and only 3,230 by
1876.105 The low number of available troops struggled to keep the violence at bay. The inability
of federal military force to stop the widespread political violence in the South during this era
sheds light on the deep entrenchment of racism and animosity in the post-war South.
Federal troops were tasked with protecting the safety and rights of freedpeople in the
South from attacks by white Southerners.106 However, this did nothing to prevent the violence
long term, and federal military power could not be utilized forever. In 1874, Grant vocalized his
concerns with Reconstruction and expressed his belief that it needed to come to an end.107 Grant
believed that the effort was a failure and would keep the Republican Party from moving forward
and winning elections.108 By distancing themselves from the failing process the Republicans
could be more successful as a national party. However, those in favor of equality for black men
and women feared that without the aid of the federal government, freedpeople would continue to
be terrorized and white southern Democrats would bring the South back to its pre-Civil War
days, except for legalized slavery.
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The year 1875 saw a severe escalation in political violence towards black and white
Republicans in Mississippi, as the general public was fed up with Reconstruction and federal
troops were unable to stop the terror. This increase stemmed from the implementation of the
“Mississippi Plan” as white Southern Democrats moved to destroy the power of the Republican
party in the state. Joel Stanford Hays noted that the Mississippi Plan was intended to:
nullify the effect of the Reconstruction laws, to restore a white minority to power through
the agency of the Democratic Party, and in so doing emphasize to the African American
population once and for all that they were to be subservient to the white population.109
In essence, the plan’s goal was to re-establish white dominance in the South, bring the
Democratic party into power in the state, and break free of the confines of the Reconstruction
Amendments. These goals were achieved through both violent and nonviolent means.
The intimidation of Republican voters, especially black men who went to the polls, was
carried out by organized groups such as the White League and the Red Shirts in Mississippi, as
federal intervention had shut down the Ku Klux Klan by 1872.110 These groups sought to return
Mississippi to Democratic control and achieved this aim by terrorizing black men into either
staying away from the polls or voting the Democratic ticket. In 1875, this plan was put into
action and was ultimately successful in its goals. In February of 1876, James W. Lee wrote to
Governor Ames and states, “[t]he policy of intimidation had been so successfully managed that
many colored men kept away from the polls.”111 The Democratic Party’s intimidation of black
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men altered the election outcomes in its favor by limiting the total number of votes for the
Republican Party and guaranteeing a Democratic victory.
While political violence in Mississippi had a profound impact on the elections of 1875
and 1876 in the state, as Democrats utilized terror to advance their political agenda and retain the
power of white supremacy, it did not go unnoticed by a national audience. Accusations of
election tampering led to a Senate hearing in order to determine if the elections were fair, or if
intimidation and election fraud had skewed the results. This hearing involved many witnesses, as
various incidents were recounted and explored. The records from these proceedings are detailed
in a testimony taken under the resolution of the Senate in December 1876. One such account
describes the violence and intimidation that black men faced from Democratic “military clubs”
while trying to exercise their right to vote. These organizations sought to return the South to
Democratic rule by disrupting the political process. A witness at the proceedings described what
he had been told by black Mississippians who had experienced the violence first-hand:
Several leading colored men came to me after the election and told me what had occurred
on the night before the election: that these men would gallop up to their houses, firing off
their pistols and guns…[a]nd they would tell him, “[w]e have come here to tell you that
you had better not go there to-morrow, as all the negroes are going to be killed…”112
This intimidation achieved Democrats’ goals because many black men did not go to the polls for
fear of being injured or killed. Further along in the transcript the witness explained, “[a] colored
man told me that they had not gone to the election because of the firing of these men.”113 The
organized Democrats’ intimidation tactics caused black Republican voters to stay away from the
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polls. Through this election violence, white Democrats seized political control in 1875, as white
supremacy once again reigned supreme in the state.114 As Democrats gained control of the
legislature they forced the resignation of Republicans in the state, including Governor Ames, in
order to further solidify their political power.115 Governor Ames resigned rather than face
impeachment by the Democratic legislature, and after his time in office he remarked on
Mississippi’s political position saying, “[y]es a revolution has taken place—by force of arms—
and a race are disenfranchised—they are to be returned to a condition of serfdom—an era of
second slavery.”116 Thus, political terror effectively ended Reconstruction in Mississippi .
The unchecked political terrorism that occurred in Georgia and Mississippi during the
Reconstruction era highlights the complex and chaotic process that existed across the South in
the post-Civil War era. On one hand, Mississippi chose to implement strict black codes and
utilize organized political terrorism to accomplish its goals. On the other hand, Georgia initially
opted for a more subtle approach to avoid federal interference, which later transformed into
enormous political terrorism. Despite taking varying approaches to violence, white Democrats in
the two states had similar aims: restore white supremacy and keep black men away from the
polls. Both states succeeded in their goals as Reconstruction came to an end and racism
continued as the law of the land in Georgia and Mississippi.
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